Within law and legal scholarship there are different models of legal personality and legal capacity. The most well known of these emphasises individual rationality, and is distilled into the medico-legal concept of 'mental capacity'. In connection with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) a new approach to legal personality is being developed, emphasizing relationships of support and recognition of universal legal capacity. Recent scholarship on both 'mental capacity' and CRPD approaches to legal capacity have drawn from feminist writings on relational autonomy. In this paper, I use this scholarship on relational autonomy to explore the differences between these approaches to legal capacity. I argue that the approach connected with the CRPD offers a refreshing take on the importance of relationships of support in exercising legal capacity. However, despite their pronounced differences, especially in relation to the legitimacy of coercion, there are remarkable similarities in the underlying challenges for each approach: the extent to which others can 'know' our authentic and autonomous selves, and the inextricable relationships of power that all forms of legal capacity are embedded within.
INTRODUCTION
Law and legal scholarship recognizes a diverse family of legal practices concerned with the concepts of 'legal personality' and 'legal capacity', which govern whether and how different entities may enjoy legal rights and duties (Tur, 1987) . Naffine (2003) describes how different models of legal personality and legal capacity hinge on different metaphysical prerequisites, and have different normative implications for the kinds of rights and duties different legal entities may enjoy and how they may exercise them. In its barest sense, legal personality is simply a functional placeholder that could be Beyond agreement that autonomy is valuable, but cannot be divorced from relational and social conditions, RA approaches are very diverse (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000; Stoljar, 2013) . Causal accounts emphasise the importance of external causal conditions, such as relationships with parents, teachers and friends, that provide the necessary 'support and guidance' for the development of autonomy (Nedelsky, 1989, p. 12) . Others, like Oshana (2006) , go further, and argue that social and relational conditions are constitutive of autonomy; regardless of a person's individual make-up, they are not autonomous unless certain social and relational conditions are satisfied. Oshana's constitutive account is more tolerant of non-consensual interventions to 'rescue' individuals from oppressive social circumstances, even if they themselves have chosen to live in such circumstances. For this reason it has attracted criticism by scholars who prefer models of autonomy that place a greater emphasis on individual capacities for reasoning and reflection (Christman, 2004; Holroyd, 2009; ) .
RA approaches can also encompass symbolic critiques of Western culture's idealisation of a 'masculine' ideal of autonomy -atomistic, self-sufficient, rational and unemotional (Brown, 2002; Code, 1991; Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000; Scott, 1996) . Much of the 'support paradigm' scholarship could be viewed as engaging in a similar symbolic critique (e.g. Quinn & Arstein-Kerslake 2012) . 'Ethic of care' approaches, that emphasise the value of relationships of care and interdependency, are also sometimes connected with RA (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000: 8-10; Herring, 2013a: 72) . However, some disability scholars have criticized the "ethic of care" as being insufficiently attentive to rights and power relations within relationships of care (Herring, 2013; Shakespeare, 2013) . Tensions between 'ethic of care' and 'rights based' approaches to support can be discerned in the mental capacity and support paradigm literature.
Theories of autonomy have an important influence on models of legal personality. Individual liberal models are most obviously associated with Naffine's 'responsible subject', but RA approaches are increasingly invoked in connection with both 'mental capacity' and 'support paradigm' approaches to legal capacity. Because of their diverse metaphysical, ethical and political underpinnings, RA approaches can be used to advocate for very different positions. This is reflected in the very different ways they are used in the literature on legal personality and capacity: on the one hand, RA approaches are being used to rehabilitate mental capacity models, and on the other they are being used to reject them altogether. Legal scholars should exercise caution when praying in aid 'relational' approaches; because of their diversity it is far from self-evident how these should translate into legal frameworks or everyday life.
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MENTAL CAPACITY AND RELATIONAL AUTONOMY
Although 'mental capacity' is not synonymous with moral and political philosophies of autonomy (Owen et al, 2009) , in many respects its legal functions are closely analogous. Christman and Anderson (2005, p. 3) describe liberal understandings of autonomy as meaning that freedom and responsibility flow from a person satisfying competence and authenticity requirements. Mental capacity law is structured similarly: a person is accorded legal rights and responsibilities only insofar as they are found to be competent and their decisions are authentically theirs. However, an examination of the MCA's case law reveals that the courts struggle to reconcile the influence of relationships to competence and authenticity requirements connected with mental capacity, resulting in complex and sometimes contradictory rulings.
Value neutral or substantive autonomy?
Under the MCA, a person is considered unable to make a decision if they are unable to understand, retain, or use or weigh the relevant information -including about the reasonably foreseeable consequences -or to communicate their decision.
2 This 'functional' approach was preferred to tests based on the outcome of a decision 3 (Law Commission, 1991) , and the MCA cautions that a person is not to be regarded as 'incapable' merely because they make an unwise decision. 4 This resembles a procedural 'value neutral' approach to autonomy, rather than substantive approaches that require people to hold certain values or decide in a particular way in order to be regarded as autonomous (Christman & Anderson, 2005; Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000, p.13; Stoljar, 2013) . However several commentators argue that mental capacity does, inevitably, contain substantive commitments (Banner, 2012; Charland, 2001; Craigie, 2013; Freyenhagen & O'Shea, 2013; Holroyd, 2012) . Empirical research suggests that assessors find it very difficult to distinguish between 'incapacitous' and 'unwise' decisions (Emmett et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2012) . Some argue that the value judgments underlying mental capacity assessments should be made more transparent (Freyenhagen & O'Shea, 2013; Kong, 2014) .
Acknowledging that mental capacity assessment is not 'value neutral' raises the question of whose values should inform the assessment -the person's own, the assessors, or wider societal values? 2 s3(1) MCA. Please note, that a person who is 'unable to make a decision' is only regarded as lacking mental capacity if certain causal conditions contained within s2(1) MCA are also satisfied; this is discussed below.
3 Outcome tests might, for example, consider the 'reasonableness' of a decision.
4 s1(4) MCA Post-print of article: Lucy Series, 'Relationships, autonomy and legal capacity: Mental capacity and support paradigms ' (2015) 
Internalism or externalism?
O'Shea (2011) and Ashley (2013) characterize accounts of autonomy as either internalist -requiring only 'internal' decision making capacities, authenticity conditions and attitudes to self to be satisfied -or externalist, requiring certain external 'enabling conditions' to be satisfied such as freedom from duress, manipulation, coercion and domination. Externalist accounts -like Oshana's (2006) -mean that a person who satisfies internal criteria for autonomy could still be regarded as non-autonomous because of their oppressive relationships or social circumstances. As noted above, such accounts can be controversial if they endorse non-consensual interventions in situations where a person is considered 'oppressed' but still satisfies 'internal' criteria for autonomy (Christman, 2004; Holroyd, 2009 ). Questions of internalism and externalism also arise for mental capacity, and can inspire similar controversies about the appropriateness of interventions where people may be 'incompetent' or 'competent' but for their relationships with particular individuals.
In some senses, the MCA resembles 'internalist' approaches to autonomy, as it includes an additional causation requirement whereby people are only treated as lacking mental capacity if they are unable to make a decision "because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain"
5
. This causation requirement encodes a 'medical' or 'individual' model of incapacity, contrasting with the social models of disability that underpin the support paradigm. This causation requirement takes the courts into tricky metaphysical territory: how should they distinguish between the entangled effects of impairment, social surroundings and biography? 6 Some disabled people have successfully argued that they had mental capacity, by attributing decision making difficulties to other causes than an impairment -for example a relationship with a predatory sex offender 7 , religious beliefs 8 or a 'challenging personality'. 9 Paradoxically, given these uses, this may also constitute a form of disability discrimination (Carson, 1993; Martin, 2014 Tensions between internalist and externalist accounts of mental capacity can also be observed in a series of cases concerning consent to sex. Public authorities have repeatedly argued that a person's mental capacity to consent to sex is affected by relationships with sexual partners, but the courts have resisted this interpretation out of concern that it could result in paternalistic and intrusive "vetting" of potential sexual partners (Series, 2015) . 10 These rulings have been criticised by feminist theorists for not attending to the relational dimensions of decision making (Clough, 2014; Herring & Wall, 2014 ).
Yet if mental capacity assessments did take into account the deleterious effects of particular relationships this could permit more paternalistic interventions, evoking similar controversies to externalist constitutive approaches to autonomy like Oshana's, which permit coercive interventions on the basis of the properties of oppressive relationships.
Relationships as threats to autonomy
It would not be correct, however, to say that the MCA is never attentive to relational aspects of decision making. On a number of occasions, the courts have authorized interventions to restrict contact with third parties who are said to exercise such a negative influence over a person's decision making that they lack mental capacity. In some cases, the 'rescued' individuals adamantly opposed such interventions
11
, in others the person's 'true' views were disputed. For example, in LBX v K, L was said to be "poorly equipped to resist" the overbearing influence of his father, and he voiced conflicting preferences to different people. 12 Once removed from the care of his father, he expressed a preference not to see him.
In London Borough of Redbridge v G, 13 a local authority received numerous safeguarding referrals about a 94 year old woman called G, concerning two individuals who had moved into her home.
Witnesses described seeing C and F shouting and screaming at G 14 , isolating her from family and friends and felt that she was scared of them. C and F had told G that if she asked them to leave she would be placed in a care home, and the local authority was unable to convince her of their plans to , and had told a doctor and independent social worker that she was like "the fly in the spider's web"
16
. Yet in the presence of C and F, including in the courtroom and before journalists, G insisted that she wanted them to remain. The court concluded that G lacked the mental capacity to decide (inter alia) whether the individuals should continue to live with her. It held that she was "paralysed with fear by the threats regarding her removal to a care-home". 17 The court held that her true wishes and feelings were hard to discern; notwithstanding G's objections in court, it authorised the removal of the individuals from her home, and a care plan to support her to remain there and be re-integrated into her church and social world.
These rulings suggest that -outside the sphere of consent to sex at least -the courts treat mental capacity as being partially constituted by freedom from oppressive relationships with others.
Relationships as enabling autonomy
The RA literature also emphasises that relationships can foster autonomy, through providing appropriate support (Nedelsky, 1989 (Benaroyo & Widdershoven, 2004, p. 305;  cited by Donnelly, 2010) . Similarly, Banner and Szmukler (2013) There is much wisdom in exhortations to try to understand other people's values and frames of meaning, and that dialogue can promote authentic and diachronically coherent decision making.
However, there is little acknowledgement in these RA accounts that mental capacity assessment is "embedded in unequal power relations between professionals and individuals" (Beaupert & Steele, 2014) . This is no ordinary dialogue: assessors must -on these accounts -at some point come to a view as to a person's 'true' or authentic values and beliefs, and assess their decisions against these.
Dialogical approaches thus implicitly confer upon mental capacity assessors 'epistemic privilege' to know a person's 'true' values and beliefs and how these have influenced their reasoning. Yet as Skowron (2014 , citing Kittay, 2009 ) comments, there are reasons for requiring "epistemic modesty"
here, being clear about the limits of assessors' knowledge.
Stefan (1992) (1993) These approaches necessarily require the assessed person to engage in dialogue with assessors about their values, beliefs and reasoning; little attention has been paid to how this might be experienced.
Although, as Smzukler (2009. p. 649) suggests, some people may experience this conversation as "therapeutic", it is far from clear that all will. Assessments could easily be experienced as intrusive, or as a taxing demand to 'construct a convincing case' (Morgan & Veitch, 2004) in order to retain control over matters of great personal significance. Case law offers several examples of people who were found to lack mental capacity by assessors whom they did not like or trust -and thus refused to co-operate with -only to be found to have mental capacity by other assessors whom they felt less 27 A similar relational and hermeneutic approach to mental capacity assessment is being developed by Camillia
Kong as part of a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship at the University of Oxford (personal communication, 2014) . A book on this subject is anticipated.
antipathy towards. 29 A relationship of trust cannot always be presumed, and the identity of the assessor matters a great deal.
The RA literature on the MCA typically assumes that clinicians -or sometimes social welfare professionals -will play the role of supporting and assessing mental capacity (e.g. Banner & Szmukler, 2013; Benaroyo & Widdershoven, 2004; Donnelly, 2010: 110; Mackenzie & Rogers, 2013 ). Yet experience suggests that where mental capacity assessments are conducted by professionals, who may have little personal knowledge of the individual, it is harder to support people to make decisions (House of Lords Select Committee on the MCA, 2014, para. 70). By contrast, the support paradigm literature connected with the CRPD places a greater emphasis on personal and biographical -rather than clinical -knowledge, and the role of families and friends in supporting decision making (Bach & Kerzner, 2010) . Involving family and friends may confer practical advantages over the medicalised approach to support taken in the MCA literature -people's decisions and social worlds extend far beyond the clinical. Herring (2013a, p. 157) argues that mental capacity assessments should routinely examine how people make decisions with the support of family and friends.
This brings us to one of the key instabilities in the MCA's treatment of supported decisions. Whilst on the one hand it endorses the idea that decisions can be made with support, too much 'social scaffolding' raises doubts about where the 'true' responsibility for the decision should lie. This dilemma is starkly illustrated by the case of V v R. 30 V sought compensation from a driver who had hit her in a road traffic accident, leading to multiple physical injuries and a head injury. In considering her mental capacity to conduct that litigation, 31 the court heard that she relied heavily upon her mother for advice, and her mother felt she was incapable of making important decisions for herself. However, the court concluded that she had the mental capacity to litigate on the "clear understanding' that she would 'continue to receive the help, support and advice of her parents." 32 Yet in a later hearing, a different judge concluded that V lacked the mental capacity to make financial decisions because she relied so heavily on her mother's advice, saying "the guiding person in making the decision was her Post-print of article: Lucy Series, 'Relationships, autonomy and legal capacity: Mental capacity and support paradigms ' (2015) 
Support and coercion
A key distinction between the MCA's approach to 'support' and the support paradigm connected with the CRPD is the extent to which support is consensual. In a number of cases under the MCA the 'support principle' has grounded interventions that conflicted with a person's expressed wishes. The Mental Health Trust v DD is an extreme example of this. 34 Following growing concerns by medical professionals and social workers about DD's inability to care for her children, five of whom had been removed from her care, and her refusal to engage with ante-natal care in the context of serious complications in previous pregnancies, they sought an assessment of her mental capacity to make decisions about contraception. Because DD refused to engage with professionals, the court authorised forced entry to her home and her removal to a health centre to be given 'education' about contraception and a capacity assessment. 35 Later judgments reported that this intervention had put , TZ was found to lack the mental capacity to assess the risks of prospective sexual partners. The court ordered that he be given a named support worker who would oversee a "programme of education and empowerment", accompanying him on outings and reminding TZ of "appropriate behaviour". 39 The plan offered space for TZ to enjoy privacy and the opportunity to make "mistakes" in order to learn through experience, but this privacy was closely bounded. If TZ wished to leave his care home and cohabit with somebody, there would be an assessment of his mental capacity to make that choice. If TZ wished to bring a sexual partner back to his care home, they would be "subject to safeguarding checks to protect other residents". 40 One wonders if many people could initiate sexual relationships under such conditions.
The cases of DD and TZ reveal the significant potential for hard paternalistic intervention within the MCA's approach to 'support'. Superficially, they are based upon a view that coercion and control can be used to foster and enhance autonomy; a view that is rejected by Clough (2014) , who argues that perpetuating a lack of choice and control over a person's own life increases their overall vulnerability.
They contrast sharply with the approach to support connected with the CRPD; the General Comment states that support must be based on the person's will and preferences and that the person must be able to refuse support (para. 24).
'Relational best interests'
The literature on the MCA has also explored relational dimensions of best interests decisions made on behalf of a person who is said to lack mental capacity. Best interests decision makers must "so far as reasonably practicable, permit and encourage the person to participate, or to improve his ability to Dunn's (2008) describes the importance of 'relational' personal knowledge in best interests decisions made by care workers. Other scholars have considered how the interests of others can become ensnared with those of the individual and will need to be considered (Herring, 2013b; Herring & Foster, 2012; Martin et al., 2012) . Some 'relational' accounts of best interests have a pronounced coercive undertow, however. A striking example of this is a hypothetical scenario described by Herring (2013b, p. 19-20; 2013a, p. 174-5) where he suggests that a person with incontinence problems could be subjected to surgery to correct this despite his refusal if his partner found dealing with his incontinence "unpleasant", in order to preserve this important relationship. Yet scenarios like this are precisely why disability rights campaigners emphasise the importance of non-familial sources of assistance being available (Campbell, 2008 ). An equalities perspective would pose the question: is this principle that important relationships are to be preserved through coercion to be extended to nondisabled people as well? It might be thought that this scenario displays characteristics of oppression that are critiqued in many RA accounts.
'Best interests' approaches are rejected in the support paradigm connected with the CRPD for not giving sufficient respect to an individual's 'will and preferences' (Jütten, 2014; General Comment, para. 18bis 
LEGAL CAPACITY AND THE SUPPORT PARADIGM UNDER THE CRPD
The support paradigm aims to offer a new and more "cosmopolitan" approach to legal capacity, based on ideas of "shared personhood" and an acknowledgement of universal reliance on myriad supports to "to help us forge our own pathways" (Quinn & Arstein-Kerslake 2012. p. 38) . It is characterized by attempts to maximize the extent to which a person's legal agency reflects their will and preferences, regardless of their perceived or actual mental capacity.
As a sui generis approach to legal subjectivity, the metaphysical and normative underpinnings of the support paradigm are still evolving. In some places in the literature, it appears to rest on a causal claim similar to Nedelsky's (1989) argument that autonomy is always, for everyone, dependent upon supportive relationships which enable autonomy to develop, and that it is necessary to be given opportunities to make decisions, including mistakes, in order to develop autonomy. Others, like
Silvers and Francis (2009) appear to be making a stronger constitutive claim: that provided they stand in an appropriate relationship with an individual, supporters can satisfy what would ordinarily be 'internal' competence criteria such that the person themselves is regarded as autonomous. On this model, third parties serve a "prosthetic" function, to whom 'competence' can be outsourced and yet decisions still remain authentically the person's own. Metaphysically, this raises contested 'extended mind' arguments in the philosophy of mind (discussed by Nelson, 2009) , and the metaphysics as such will not be discussed here. However, I offer some practical and legal reasons why it may be problematic to treat third parties' decision making processes as if they were the person's own.
This section considers the support paradigm by exploring some of the specific practices which have been proposed as recognizing and fostering this more cosmopolitan approach to legal capacity, and the issues arising therein. 
Supported decision making
By 'supported decision making', I mean systems of supports where one or more people assist another to make a decision and communicate it to others. 48 This could be through helping them to obtain and understand information relevant to the decision, talking through the pros and cons of different available options, or helping a person to communicate with others. There is, clearly, considerable overlap between 'supported decision making' under the CRPD and some of the dialogical approaches described above in connection with the MCA. However, there are some core differences between supported decision making under the MCA and the CRPD.
Support under the CRPD tends to be construed in a much more holistic way than under the MCA; it is not only available when a person's mental capacity to make a specific decision is called into question, The Personal Ombudsmen (PO) scheme, developed in Skåne, Sweden, by users of mental health services, is also often cited in the literature. POs are professionals -typically lawyers or social workers with no allegiance to psychiatry or social services -that work entirely on their clients' commission.
Jesperson (2013) reports that clients' first priorities are often "existential" matters, and may not be the same as those of services and relatives. PO's must be willing to discuss these matters and resist the urge to simply "fix" things; after many months clients may trust their PO sufficiently to request help from them.
48 Although the CRPD Committee do not follow this distinction in the GC, referring to a wide range of supports as 'supported decision making', including those that I have referred to here as 'facilitated decision making'. See also Gooding (2015) for discussion of this issue.
An evaluation of the South Australian pilot study found that it prevented entry into guardianship and many people successfully applied for 'administration orders' to manage their property and affairs to be lifted (Wallace, 2012) . Studies of the PO system found clear benefits to clients in terms of meaningful occupations, social contacts and reductions in symptoms of psychiatric illness (Engman et al., 2008, p. 23 ). An economic analysis found that the PO scheme delivered significant savings because of the reduced need for crisis interventions and other services (Nilsson, 2006) . These findings suggest that being able to choose and shape relationships of support can play a vital role in building trust, which in turn increases the likelihood that they will effectively foster personal autonomy. This is a clear strength of support paradigm.
The General Comment requires states to provide legal frameworks that offer formal legal recognition to a support person chosen by the individual (para. 25(d)) and several jurisdictions already offer such frameworks. 49 Formalising support has several attractions. It should give supporters greater leverage when accessing information on the person's behalf or helping them to communicate their views. It may be easier to detect and respond to exploitation and abuse in formalised support relationships (Carter & Chesterman, 2009 ). Procedural safeguards can potentially be built into formalised supports;
for example, 'Representation Agreements' in British Columbia, Canada, allow a person to appoint a 'monitor' to monitor the activities of their chosen representative. Legislating for supported decisions can also clarify where legal responsibility for supported decisions lie -a key concern under the MCA, as we saw in the case of V.
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However, informality may also be attractive in certain situations. The success of the PO scheme in gaining trust is attributed, in part, to its strong guarantees of confidentiality -no third party is informed that a person is using a PO's services, and all paperwork is retained by the client not the PO.
This would be hard to replicate in a system where supporters had to be registered with an external body and submit to their monitoring. Instruments that allow supporters to act as a person's legal Post-print of article: Lucy Series, 'Relationships, autonomy and legal capacity: Mental capacity and support paradigms ' (2015) character -both for better and for worse -and has knock on consequences on whether and how they foster autonomy.
The support paradigm does raise difficult metaphysical questions about 'ownership' of a decision, as discussed in relation to the case of V. Responding to this kind of concern, Silvers and Francis (2009, p. 485) argue that supporters should be viewed as a prosthesis for thinking, whereby their "reasoning and communicating can execute part or all of a subject's own thinking processes". Accordingly, they argue, we should attribute the functioning of the prosthesis to the agent using them: "The racer, not the metal foot, is taken to be running the race" (p. 486). Yet as Arstein-Kerslake (2014) influence is inescapable for everyone (Quigley, 2013; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003 ). Yet logically, framing effects cannot always impair autonomous agency, or we should never be autonomous. The critical question is: when does 'influence' threaten authentic agency? In legal terms, the CRPD contains a distinction that is also found in English law, between influence and 'undue influence'. Yet defining the point at which influence becomes 'undue' is no easy matter, and is discussed below.
Self-binding directives and co-decision making
Although the support paradigm is generally highly consensual, the literature endorses instruments that give advance consent to measures that may conflict with a person's expressed will and preferences in the future (Flynn & Arstein-Kerslake, 2014; Minkowitz, 2013b 52 So named after legendary Greek hero Ulysses (Odysseus), who wanted to hear the song of the sirens although it would render him incapable of rational thought and draw him to self-destruction. He asked his men to tie him to the mast of his ship as they sailed past the sirens, to plug their ears with wax and not to untie him whatever he might say (Bielby, 2014; Dresser, 1982; Radoilska, 2012 ).
enhance autonomous agency by binding our future selves; secondly, that interpersonal dynamics are a key element of self-determination, and we can deploy others to promote our own diachronic autonomy through "empowering kinds of reliance on others" (Radoilska, 2011, p. 266) . Ulysses agreements do not necessarily require a person to be 'incompetent' in order to come into effect (Bielby, 2014) . They can present "ethical hazards" because they require a person's presently expressed wishes to be overruled; for example Walton (2003) gives the example of birth plans that prohibit the administration of pain relief even if a woman in labour later requests it. Dresser (1982) questions whether Ulysses agreements are as non-paternalistic as they aspire to be, highlighting the absence of any non-arbitrary basis for choosing which set of preferences -past or present -others are to treat as binding. Careful consideration needs to be given to when self-binding directives come into effect and how they can be revoked if the CRPD moves away from a mental capacity based model;
what disability neutral criteria could be used to prefer a person's decision at one time over another?
Co-decision making agreements rest on a similar logic to Ulysses agreements. They are provided for in several Canadian jurisdictions (James & Watts, 2014) , and may soon be adopted in Because of the potential for co-decision makers to veto a person's choices, they are said to lean 'more closely to a substituted decision-making model' (James & Watts, 2014, p. 58 ). Yet they are potentially useful for people who trust a third party to make decisions on their behalf but who wish to remain involved and informed and retain the ability to veto decisions that they do not agree with. They might potentially be useful for people who sometimes make impulsive decisions that they later regret, who would like a trusted third party to 'sign off' on important legal decisions. Like Ulysses agreements, questions may arise as to how easily a person can dismantle a co-decision making agreement. At present most statutes require a person to have the mental capacity to do so. A move away from a mental capacity standard would need to carefully consider how to strike an appropriate balance between a person's ability to extricate themselves from an agreement that was not working for them without making them so easy to dismantle it undermined the entire purpose of an instrument designed to iron out fluctuations in expression of agency.
Facilitated decision making
Facilitated decision making is one of the most conceptually challenging elements of the support paradigm. It was first developed by Bach and Kerzner (2010) Understanding why facilitated decisions are not 'substitute decisions', and thereby prohibited within the support paradigm, requires a careful reading of the General Comment. Facilitated decisions would not fall within its threefold definition of substitute decisions 55 provided they did not void any discernible efforts to exercise legal agency, did not involve appointing a facilitated decision maker against the person's will, and any decisions were made on the basis of the facilitator's "best interpretation" of the person's will and preferences, rather than their objective 'best interests' (General Comment, para. 18bis). Such approaches are described as more 'intensive' forms of support (paras. 15-16 and 25(b) ).
It is important to consider the positioning of facilitated decisions within the wider political context of the CRPD. During the negotiations of the Convention, the International Disability Caucus resisted any language that might legitimize guardianship, such as permitting 'substitute decisions' in exceptional cases. They proposed instead that sometimes it might be necessary to provide "100% support". Post-print of article: Lucy Series, 'Relationships, autonomy and legal capacity: Mental capacity and support paradigms ' (2015) 40 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 80-91.
supporters could potentially exercise "all of a subject's own thinking processes" 57 and yet the person and not the supporter would be regarded as the agent making the decision.
Others -myself included -prefer to treat "100% support" as a 'legal fiction' rather than a metaphysical reality, and prefer a clearer recognition that the facilitator -not the person themselves -is taking the decision (Booth Glen, 2012; Canadian Association for Community Living, 2014; Gooding, 2015; Mental Disability Advocacy Center, 2014; People with Disability Australia et al., 2014; Quinn, 2010) . Facilitated decisions take place because we are uncertain as to what a person wants; they call for interpretation (General Comment, para. 18bis). It is important to recognize that facilitators have considerable power to alter a person's 'narrative' through their interpretation. They will get it wrong sometimes; if the person later on becomes able to communicate their wishes, it seems nonsensical to tell them that the decision was their own, especially if they do not recognize it as one which they would have made.
Recognizing that facilitated decisions are decisions that have been made on behalf of the person, not by them, keeps in view these important epistemic considerations and the power and responsibility of facilitators. It is perhaps in recognition of these factors that Bach and Kerzner's model includes more stringent safeguards for facilitators than supporters, and prohibits them from making certain decisions where there is a high risk of abuse or exploitation.
Facilitated decision making stretches the concept of RA to its limits. It relies upon others being able to "tell a coherent story about who we are" (Bach & Kerzner, 2010, p. 65) . The epistemic issues in facilitated decision making are no less considerable than those of dialogical mental capacity assessment. The support paradigm does not purport to offer tools to magically overcome this. Rather, 
Hard cases: risk and harm
A common criticism of the support paradigm is that it offers few tools to mitigate harmful decisions (Kohn & Blumenthal, 2013; Ward, 2014) . The literature embraces disabled peoples' right to a "dignity of risk" (Gooding, 2012) . It focuses on non-coercive interventions that could mitigate risks, counters stereotypes of 'dangerousness' and interrogates "the impulse towards protection" (Minkowitz, 2013a, p. 17) . It also highlights the risks of abuse and exploitation that guardianship and mental health laws themselves pose (Dhanda, 2006-7) . However, there is growing recognition that there will be 'troubling' situations where a person's acts or choices place them at serious risk, risks that they do not understand, where the support paradigm offers no clear or obvious solutions. Gooding (2015) , for example, quotes from Farr's (1982) first person account of psychosis, where she believed that only by jumping from the seventh floor of a building and landing on her head would she receive the ultimate Enlightenment.
The support paradigm is imbued with a desire to protect "psychiatrized persons and others from attributions of incapacity" based on "value-laden assessments of the risks and benefits at stake" (Wildeman, 2013, p. 60) . It is very difficult to think of legal principles and safeguards to cope with these dilemmas that would not provide a toehold for full blown guardianship and civil commitment regimes to creep back in. Moreover, in discussing hard cases there is a danger that they will be rhetorically deployed as "extreme case formulations" (Pomerantz, 1986) to legitimize the very practices the CRPD sought to eradicate. And yet... these hard cases do exist, and when we are confronted with them we would hope that the support paradigm could supply some clear principles and safeguards for dealing with them. To do otherwise risks situations of domination where the principles governing such interventions are unclear and arbitrary, and in common law jurisdictions creates space for the courts to develop paternalistic principles to fill any lacunae.
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The literature on the support paradigm offers some tentative proposals for dealing with hard cases of risk, but these are difficult to reconcile with the General Comment -and, indeed, with each other. Post-print of article: Lucy Series, 'Relationships, autonomy and legal capacity: Mental capacity and support paradigms ' (2015) on respecting a person's will and preferences by arguing that sometimes a person's present acts or verbal expressions diverge from their 'true' will and preferences; saying that third parties should "support the individual by taking whatever actions are necessary to augment her decision-making ability to a point at which she can clearly express her will and preferences" (p. 98).
Each of these approaches rests on the plausible intuition that that sometimes we experience temporary disturbances in authentic and autonomous agency. Yet they also confer epistemic privilege, and thereby power, upon others, in assuming that they will be able to accurately detect these disturbances, and intervene accordingly. Any law that legitimates interventions on these 61 For an example of a 'minimal' requirement for understanding for consent to sex, see s5A(4) Criminal Law Post-print of article: Lucy Series, 'Relationships, autonomy and legal capacity: Mental capacity and support paradigms ' (2015) 40 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 80-91. grounds necessarily positions others as sometimes knowing ourselves better than we do, with all the epistemic uncertainty and power relations this entails. Without wishing to dismiss the claim that sometimes others are able to identify situations where we are 'not ourselves', it is not immediately obvious that a claim to know a person's true will and preferences better than they do is a preferable basis for coercive intervention, or is any less prone to subjective and arbitrary interpretation, than mental incapacity and best interests, or even risk.
The CRPD injects another element, however, into hard cases. It calls for recognition that vulnerability and risk is a universal phenomenon with a complex aetiology, and is not limited to people with disabilities or mental disorders (Clough, 2014; Scully, 2014 (Szerletics, 2011) . This offers a potential model for disability neutral interventions (Clough, 2014) .
However, the possibility of non-consensual interventions for those without mental disorders has caused consternation among some liberal theorists (Christman, 2004; Holroyd, 2009 ) and indeed the general public (Department of Health, 2013) . Requirements for disability neutrality also potentially conflict with older international human rights instruments that require an explicit finding of 'mental disorder' for coercive interventions, and the idea of laws permitting preventive detention on a generic basis has raised concerns of political abuse (Bartlett, 2012a; Fennell and Khaliq, 2011) . The CRPD forces us to confront the question: why are measures to mitigate risk and vulnerability that are considered acceptable when imposed on people with mental disabilities considered unacceptable if imposed on the population as a whole (Bartlett, 2012b) ? Perhaps if interventions were framed in terms that could potentially affect anybody, we would proceed with greater caution.
Hard cases: undue influence
Proponents of the support paradigm and critics alike have expressed concern about the potential for undue influence, exploitation and abuse by supporters (Carter & Chesterman, 2009; Kohn & Blumenthal, 2013; Minkowitz, 2013b; Ward, 2011 (Ashley, 2013; Stoljar, 2013) . The case of G, described above, is a good example of the kinds of situations we are concerned with here. These are issues that potentially affect all people (Gooding, 2015) , but as the General Comment acknowledges "may be exacerbated for those who rely on the supports of others to make decisions" (para. 18ter). Article 12(4) CRPD requires safeguards to ensure that all measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity must 'prevent abuse' and ensure that they "respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of conflict of interest and undue influence".
Undue influence is notoriously difficult to define 64 , raising difficult questions about when we should regard influence as undue. The General Comment characterises it as "where the quality of the interaction between the support person and the person being supported includes signs of fear, aggression, threat, deception or manipulation" (para. 18ter). 65 The General Comment's focus on the interaction rather than the outcome of the decision resembles procedural accounts of RA which aspire to value-neutrality (Stoljar, 2013 Safeguards could be developed whereby -as is the case in English law -where there is a presumption of undue influence by a supporter, it must be rebutted, for example by showing that the person had been given access to independent advice (Peel, 2011, para. 10-026) . Similar mechanisms might also be useful for situations where there is concern that supporters with 'conflicts of interest' may have taken advantage of their position. It will be extremely hard to avoid conflicts of interest in supporters, since many will either have personal connections or may potentially provide them with services for remuneration, so techniques for managing them will be essential.
By definition, people in situations of undue influence will have difficulty expressing their 'true' will and preferences and may, like G, be too scared to ask for assistance. How should a paradigm that is premised on maximum respect for will and preferences respond in situations of suspected undue influence, exploitation and abuse, where the person themselves indicates a preference to remain in that situation? In these situations, it is difficult to navigate the support paradigm's embrace of a dignity of risk in allowing a person to choose to enter into potentially harmful relationships, and its emphasis on recognizing 'true' expressions of will. The General Comment itself specifies that safeguards to protect against undue influence 'must also respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, including the right to take risks and make mistakes' (para. 18ter). As yet, the literature on how to proceed in these situations is limited.
Arstein-Kerslake (2014) outlines a case study of 'Joe', who has high support needs and whose father heavily influences his decisions and sometimes acts paternalistically towards him. Following a temporary spell in respite care it is decided that it is not in Joe's best interests to return to live with his father, but Joe still wishes to return there. Arstein-Kerslake contends that the state has a role in ensuring that Joe has the necessary support to understand that other options than living with his father exist, but that "if he ultimately chose to remain in his father's home, under his father's control, that decision must be respected" (p. 11). Arstein-Kerslake's case study illuminates how the 'dignity of risk' extends to choices to engage in controlling or otherwise risky relationships. Post-print of article: Lucy Series, 'Relationships, autonomy and legal capacity: Mental capacity and support paradigms ' (2015) 40 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 80-91.
The case study evokes both A Primary Care Trust v P, where P continued to express a preference to live with his mother even after experiencing other living options, and LBX v K where L expressed a preference not to return to his father's care after experiencing life elsewhere. The analysis rests on allowing a person to make an informed choice between different options; yet experience suggests that sometimes it can be extremely difficult to support a person to make such an informed choice if access to them is impeded by others. In G's case, for example, those concerned for her welfare found it almost impossible to visit her without C being present, and any information they managed to convey about the alternative support options available to her was contradicted by C. If we are to take seriously the idea that a person in this position must be given support to make a truly informed choice, in some exceptional cases stronger legal tools for intervention may be required. Use of the 'inherent jurisdiction' to restrain the actions of others who might impede a person's autonomous choices -for example, through non-molestation orders 68 or orders prohibiting a person's family from making arrangements for her marriage without her consent 69 -might provide a potential model. As with the interventions described earlier, however, there is a danger that they could be used in ways that go against the ethos of the support paradigm, and would need to be carefully considered.
CONCLUSION
Examining the MCA through the lens of RA reveals that the MCA was built upon two conflicting premises: causation requirements are premised on the idea that autonomy is a function of a person's individual psychological makeup, whilst the support principle and some parts of the case law on undue influence and mental capacity are based on the idea that sometimes autonomy can be affected by our external circumstances. This unstable underpinning has resulted in somewhat contradictory rulings regarding mental capacity, support and relationships with others.
The RA literature that has focused on the MCA has often taken a very narrow approach to 'support', whilst the support paradigm of the CRPD offers refreshing ways of thinking about how relationships can foster diachronic and relational autonomy in the exercise of legal capacity. Models such as codecision making, supported and facilitated decision making are rich with potential for more sophisticated RA theories. Post-print of article: Lucy Series, 'Relationships, autonomy and legal capacity: Mental capacity and support paradigms ' (2015) has an expressive function, and creates an opening for discussions that challenge deeply entrenched practices and ways of thinking about legal subjectivity. The CRPD also offers important new tools for approaching these discussions through its powerful focus on equality, autonomy and the external determinants of disablement, vulnerability and risk. Perhaps most importantly of all, the CRPD insists that deliberation of policies and laws relating to people with disabilities actively involve them, 70 rather than being delegated to the very 'experts' they so often empower.
There is only a very sparse literature on the experiences of people who are subject to guardianship and mental capacity laws; 71 this urgently needs remedying. If it is anything like the literature on subjective experiences of mental health laws, we should anticipate a diversity of views, but with a significant proportion feeling that coercive interventions were unjustified or unwelcome (for example, see: Katsakou and Priebe, 2006; Katsakou et al., 2010; Katsakou et al., 2012; Priebe et al., 2010; Russo and Rose, 2013) . These studies also tell us that the quality of relationships play a key role in people's experiences of such interventions (Gilburt et al., 2008) . RA approaches do not lead us to a clearly defined set of practices, but they do suggest that the law can no longer approach questions of legal capacity as a matter of individual rationality. 
